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Abstract 
The paper studies the modern conflict patterns and conflict dimensions in Sweden 
1993-2005. The aim is to trace and interpret the new patterns and dimensions of 
labour market conflict by collecting and compiling strike data from the National 
Conciliation Office, (1993-99) and the National Mediation Office (2000-2005). On 
the whole, strike activity has decreased steadily from the 1980s and onwards and in 
large parts of the Swedish labour market conflicts are very rare. A few small un-
ions organising primarily non-manufacturing working class in the domestic sector, 
account for the majority of the sanctioned conflicts. The new pattern is that the re-
maining conflicts in broad terms can be divided in two parts: conflicts over wages 
and other working conditions and conflicts about the collective bargaining itself. 
Each with its own logic.  
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tive bargaining, strike patterns  
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Introduction 
Why should we even bother to examine the strike patterns at the labour market? Isn‟t it a 
fact that the number of conflicts and working days lost has declined sharply, both in 
Sweden and in other industrialized countries since the 1970s and 1980s? By and large 
industrial relations researchers have focused on aggregate or average data in order to 
measure strike activity or trace strike patterns. This paper does, however, not fit in that 
box. Nor is it a contribution to the long and ever-lasting debate about whether conver-
gence or divergence is the dominating trend concerning strike patterns. (Shalev 1992, 
Edwards & Hyman 1994, Aligisakis 1997, Piazza 2005, Beardsmore 2006 and Perry & 
Wilson 2008)  
Instead this paper traces new patterns, trends and foremost dimensions of labour mar-
ket conflicts. The aim is to interpret the new (low) conflict pattern in Sweden during the 
last decades. The empirical results indicate that the sectoral distribution of conflict as 
well as the causes of conflict has changed dramatically. The labour market conflicts tend 
to be highly concentrated to a few unions. The next step in the analysis is to search for 
causes of the conflict patterns and if this indicates new conflict dimensions in the labour 
market.  
Considering the theories and perspectives that can explain the strike patterns, this pa-
per will focus on the new logic in strikes and other forms of industrial action. The emerg-
ing strike pattern is seen as a result of globalization, increasing competition and the inte-
grated production but also on the institutional conditions, more specifically the conflict 
rules that determine the scope for industrial conflict.  
This paper examine the available data on conflicts and strike activity on some standard 
but also some non-standard measures and therefore use primary sources. The standard 
measures are, by year, the number of conflicts and the number of days not worked. (or 
days lost) The non-standard measures are the classification of conflicts depending on the 
nature and causes of the conflict and the organizations involved. Detailed data concerning 
the strike pattern in Sweden has been collected and compiled for all labour disputes 1993-  4 
2005.
1 This is 13 years when structural economic changes as well as new rules and legis-
lative framework (the EU-membership 1995) have restructured the Swedish labour mar-
ket (Nyström 2002).  
In the paper I will stress the multi-dimensional nature of the phenomenon, which is of-
ten called ”strike pattern” or “strike activity”, As Bordogna & Prima Cella (2002) men-
tioned: “it is obvious that the strike cannot be taken to encompass every form of indus-
trial conflict”. On the contrary, in the new emerging conflict pattern in Sweden the block-
ades and sympathy actions (secondary strikes) are at least as common as strikes and no 
marginal phenomenon. 
Explaining the strike pattern – two types of conflict 
To explain labour disputes several factors has been tested. A distinction has been between 
economic and political factors and such phenomenon as unemployment, business cycles, 
technological change, globalization, political radicalization and union organizing have 
been investigated, but without consensus. (Thörnqvist 1994). This paper identifies two 
major causes of conflicts nowadays, conflicts over wages and other working conditions 
and conflicts about the collective bargaining itself. The logic of these conflicts differs be-
cause in the first case it affects parties both of which belong to the collective bargaining 
system. In the second case, one of the parties, the employer, is outside the collective bar-
gaining system (Moberg 2006, Karlson & Lindberg 2008).  
Conflicts of wages and working conditions  
 
A starting point for the study is that the conflicts in the labour market can be seen as a 
rational act of profit-maximizing actors (parties) in the context of a network of laws and 
rules – the institutional environment (Scheuer 2004). The players have incomplete, but 
often enough knowledge of the prevailing rules and other relevant conditions. This ana-
                                                 
1 Data was collected from the Statens Förlikningsmannaexpedition, National Conciliation Office, (1993-99) 
and Medlingsinstitutet, National Mediation Office, (2000-05). I especially would like to thank to Hanna 
Metsis for assistance with the collection of these data. This material is not used in previous research. In 
comparison with the statistics that the National Mediation Office publishes in their yearbooks, this paper 
gives additional information on the conflicts in Sweden 1993-2005. In contrast to the Mediation Institute, 
all labour disputes, ie. all industrial action such as strikes, lockouts, blockades, wildcat strikes and other 
industrial action, has been included in tables and graphs.   5 
lyses focus on changing conditions in the economy, which in turn affect the efficiency of 
strikes and the power relations between the parties. There is an economic logic in all as-
pects of the strike pattern; the type of conflict, the causes of the conflict and who gets in-
volved in labour market conflicts. This model is consistent with the “power resource ap-
proach” to union strategies. Industrial action function is primarily to push the other party 
to the concessions that you provide economic benefits of a final position of strength 
(Åmark 1989; Åmark 1993). 
Workers structural power results from the location of workers within the economic 
system.  You  can  divide  structural  power  into  marketplace  bargaining  power  and 
workplace bargaining power. The latter concept has been elaborated by Silver (2003) and 
is connected to workers who in tightly integrated production processes, where a localized 
work stoppage in key nodes cause disruptions. (Perrone 1984) Such workers have the 
highest positional power or disruptive potential and can therefore benefit from that posi-
tion in case of conflicts. 
At the same time, strike data may be interpreted in opposite ways. A low propensity to 
strike or engage in other forms of industrial action may be a consequence of low labor 
power, but also of high labor power, if the sheer threat of a strike leads employers to give 
up. And of course vice versa is also the case. (Bacarro – Howell 2011) So the question of 
how to explain and interpret strike data is not simple. In this paper the explanations of the 
strike patterns rests on the assumption that globalization shifts power resources towards 
employers, but this shift is to some extent neutralized by shifting producing concepts that 
gives some workers larger power resources. 
 
Conflicts of collective bargaining as such 
 
Disputes  concerning  the  wages  and  benefits  of  all  sorts  are  traditionally  the  biggest 
source of conflict at the Swedish labour market, according to Thörnqvist 1994, but to ex-
plain the modern conflict pattern this is not enough. A fundamental aim for trade unions 
in Sweden, both historically and in today, have been to increase bargaining coverage in 
order to restrict competition between the workers – but also between employers. (Åmark 
1993). The strategy has been to prevent competition from unorganized workers and ex-  6 
tend bargaining coverage to such non-unionized workplaces, through conflicts. Employ-
ers who do not  want  to  join employers' associations  are thus  included in  the system 
through an application agreement. It signifies, essentially, that in each case the employer 
undertakes to  apply the collective agreement  envisaged in  the application  agreement, 
usually the sectoral agreement covering a particular branch of activity. These types of 
conflict between non-organized companies and trade unions aim for higher bargaining 
coverage, which in return should help the unions to maintain wages and other working 
conditions. 
 
Globalization and changing production conditions 
 
To explain the strike pattern, several approaches have been used. On the one hand there 
are those that focus on economic factors and on the other hand those who focus on politi-
cal factors. Within these, factors such as unemployment, business cycles, technological 
change, globalization, political radicalization and union organizing has been tested – but 
no consensus has been established (Thörnqvist 1994).  
In recent years, globalization has become an increasingly important aspect in strike re-
search. One hypothesis is that globalization would reduce the propensity to strike. Glob-
alization is hereby defined as a process of closer integration of economies and societies, 
for example the exchange of goods and services, often measured by export and import 
share and foreign direct investment, First and foremost, with the increasing competition 
at the international markets, profit margins tend to fall and this make cost reductions nec-
essary. When competition was limited and primarily between domestic companies they 
were more likely to accept the employees' demands. All extra (wage-related) costs could 
be met by price increases, which shift the costs to consumers or to the taxpayers. Those 
employers that face stiff competition must deal with cost increases with the risk of jeop-
ardizing the competitiveness. This provides incentives to be tougher in the bargaining 
phase and it also reduces workers willingness to take a conflict (Moberg 2006, Traxler, 
Blaschke and Kittel 2001). 
In addition, globalization may offer more opportunities to outsource production or 
other activities in countries with lower costs, which would put wages and working condi-  7 
tions under pressure in countries with higher costs (Piazza 2005; Scheuer 2006). These 
factors may lead to reduced strength for unions which reduce their ability to use strikes as 
weapons. Labour conflicts and therefore unions lose in strength at the expense of busi-
ness  interests. Statistics from  the OECD area  also  shows how conflicts  and conflict-
volume is falling sharply in most countries (Thörnqvist 1994; Karlson, Lindberg and 
Salabasis 2005, Scheuer 2006). 
To some extent globalization has probably undermined the power of the unions and 
blunted the strikes (Scheuer 2006). This process may, however, have different effects in 
different  countries  depending  on  the  institutional  setup,  primarily  the  conflict  rules 
(Western, 1997; Wallerstein and Western 2000). For example, the dismantling of the cen-
tralized bargaining system in the Nordic countries will rather increase the possibility of 
labour  disputes  than  decrease,  since  more  will  negotiate  and  potential  for  secondary 
strikes will grow. Some studies also suggest that when coordination in the bargaining sys-
tem decreases, labour conflicts may increase in scope (Aidt & Tzannatos 2002).  
Changing  production  conditions  is  another  factor  that  may  influence  the  relative 
strengths between the parties. Among the features of this new production concept, often 
called "flexible specialization”, and Just in Time (JIT). Outsourcing enables owner to fo-
cus on core business and in this process the need for competitive subcontractors grow 
(Storper and Scott 1986; Gertler 1992; Maskell and Malmberg 1999). 
The new production conditions and strategies are often considered to hamper the un-
ions' ability to assert their rights and pursue their wage demands. But this is partly also a 
result of growing labour market segmentation. The core of the labour force (insiders) can 
bargain and achieve high wages and high employment protection, while the periphery 
(outsiders), often young people and immigrants, or temporary employers are stuck with 
poor working conditions and little protection (Kjellberg 2003; Åkerman 2003). With this 
growing segmentation between different groups of workers, the trade unions should have 
more difficulties in representing all groups. In addition, the temporary staff is more sel-
dom unionized, which also affects the trade union's ability to represent their interests.  
On the other hand: the dependence of companies to punctually deliver components, 
service and other necessities in the production chain make the whole system vulnerable to 
interference. Minimum delay or disruption may cause harm to all companies in the chain.   8 
Such employees, often specialised and non-replaceable can put pressure on employers, 
rather than vice versa. (Coleman and Jennings 1998; Herod 2000). 
This means that rather limited industrial action in some cases can have major conse-
quences. Some activities have become so technically and administrative complex that 
they become more vulnerable to conflict, with a relatively limited industrial action can 
affect an entire production chain. The welding of the companies, where one company's 
finished  product  becomes  the  second  company's  input,  means  that  a  relatively  small 
number of strikes or blockades can paralyze major production units or at least cause pro-
hibitive costs (Nyström 1997; Moberg 2006). Another factor of importance is the position 
and strength in which workers with a kind of monopoly position in terms of knowledge 
or skills, which also work in industries where employers are vulnerable to industrial ac-
tion, may have more incentive to strike (Cohn 1993). 
 
Labour conflicts in Sweden in the 1900s 
The conflicts at the Swedish labour market between workers and employers have been 
fluctuating. Strike incidence peaked in the years after the turn of the century, after having 
risen during the 1800s culminating decades. An extreme peak was reached after the First 
World War and another strike wave swept across Sweden after the Second World War. 
The last peak occurred during the late 1970s. In between strike activity has been lower 
and the 1950s and 1960s as well as the 1990s, have been characterized by very few regis-
tered conflicts between the parties. The conflicts have, according to official statistics, re-
mained at a historically low level during the investigated period 1993-2005 as is evident 
from Diagram 1. 
   9 
Source: SOS Statistisk årsbok för Sverige 1903-2005. 
 
The majority of labour disputes have been strikes, while a few were lockouts, including 
the great lockout 1980 and to some extent the great strike of 1909. This should be due to 
the effectiveness of the strike and lockout. The unions want as few workers as possible on 
strike, preferably a few key employees whose absence hurt employers as much as possi-
ble. Employers, on the other hand, try to make the conflict as expensive as possible for 
workers and the lockout is therefore a massive weapon (Lundh 2002). The total number 
of working days lost has a few very high peaks. Two of these took place in the post-war 
era. The first occurred shortly after the end of the World War 2, the so-called Metal strike 
in 1945, and the other was great lockout 1980.  
The distribution of conflict on trade union affiliation and causes of conflicts reveal a 
clear pattern in the 1970s and the 1980s. The LO-affiliated unions were much more con-
flict-prone than civil servants and professional unions. Among the LO-affiliated unions 
strikes occurred mainly among workers in the Metal, Factory and Woodworkers' Asso-
ciation. If the unions are ranked after strikes/member; in addition to the three the Miners 
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Association  also  places  high.  A special case is  the independent,  non-affiliated Dock-
workers Union with its very high strike rate  
The conflicts 1975-89 concerned mostly wage-issues and related topics. These con-
flicts alone accounted for nearly three quarters of the strikes that occurred. The second 
most common cause of a strike, 8 per cent, related to work organization, management and 
termination of which include, among others, the strikes that erupted when the employer 
didn‟t want to sign a collective agreement. Other strike causes had much lower percent-
ages (Thörnqvist 1994). 
Conflicts at the labour market 1993-2005 
 
The period 1993-2005 has not been studied before in Swedish strike research, except for 
Thörnqvist (2000) who pointed out that the conflict level and the intensity was declining 
in the early 1990s and remained at historically low levels in Sweden at the end of the 
1990s.  The  pattern  for  the  years  1993-2005,  see  Diagram  1,  is  however  not  entirely 
straightforward. One of the years, 1995
2, is characterized by numerous and long-standing 
conflicts. But the main part of these disputes – over half – was linked to Toys "R" Us and 
the long conflict that summer. However, the official statistics does not show other con-
flicts than strikes and lockouts and that means that an important part of the new patterns 
of conflict are not visible there. Table 1 therefore gives a more accurate impression of the 
industrial action in Sweden and is also based on primary sources. Single years such as 
1995 and to some extent 2005 and 1993, had substantially more conflicts than the other. 
It is interesting to note that of overall conflicts, the amount of strikes and lockouts were 
only slightly more than one third. The rest of the conflicts were of other types, which I 
will come back to later.  
                                                 
2 Toys "R" Us was a U.S. multi-national toy company that refused to sign a Swedish collective agreement 
with Swedish unions.  Therefore the company was subjected to extensive industrial action, foremost secon-
dary strikes. Compared to the other years 1993-2005, the Toys "R" Us-conflict was unusually fierce and 
protracted. It ended after a couple of months when Toys' R 'Us gave way and signed the agreement.   11 
 
Table 1. Number of conflicts at the Swedish labour market 1993–2005. 
 
Year  Strike  Lockout  Wild-cat 
strike 
Blockade  Other  Total   Percent 
1993  17  9  8  11  0  45  12 
1994  8  2  3  3  0  16  4 
1995  17  6  19  37  0  79  22 
1996  3  1  5  11  0  20  5 
1997  5  3  6  5  1  20  5 
1998  4  2  7  6  0  19  5 
1999  10  1  2  2  0  15  4 
2000  0  0  2  3  0  5  1 
2001  15  2  6  4  1  28  8 
2002  6  0  6  14  1  27  7 
2003  10  2  0  6  3  21  6 
2004  5  3  2  12  3  25  7 
2005  11  1  2  30  3  47  13 
Total  111  32  68  144  12  367  100 
Source: National Conciliation Board 1993–99 and National Meditation Office 2000–05. 
 
Which union and which organisations?  
A recurrent pattern strike research is that the blue-collar unions, in Sweden LO-affiliated 
workers, have had higher strike prone than other groups and in the LO has The Metal-
workers Union has been more conflict-prone (Thörnqvist 1994). The established interna-
tional literature and empirical studies based on Swedish data, have shown that the most 
conflict-prone unions and professional groups would be workers at the port, in mining 
and in forestry, but that a shift in the post-war occurred in the direction of the engineering 
industry, (Shalev 1980; Mikkelsen 1992; Thörnqvist 1994). 
 
   12 
Table 2. Union affiliation and conflicts 1993-2005. 






Central Org of the Workers of Sweden (SAC)  56  15,3  9000  622,2 
Swedish Dockworkers Union  9  2,5  2000  450 
Swedish Electricians' Union (SEF)  38  10,4  28000  135,7 
Swedish Painter's Union  23  6,3  20000  116,9 
Swedish Transport Worker's Union  28  7,6  71000  39,3 
Swedish Building Workers´ Union  34  9,3  138000  24,6 
Commercial Employees´ Union  12  3,3  174000  6,9 
Swedish Metalworkers' Union  13  3,5  410000  3,2 
Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union  8  2,2  615000  1,3 
Others  61  16,6  x  x 
Unknown, not sanctioned  85  23,2  x  x 
Total  367  100  3803000  9,6 
Anm. The group unknown includes wildcat strikes, which by nature cannot be attached to any trade union.  
 
Source: National Conciliation Board 1993–99 and National Meditation Office 2000–05, Statistical year-
book of Sweden and verbal information from Swedish Dockworkers Union. 
 
This, however, is not confirmed in the present study, which is indicated in Table 2. 
Out of the total 367 conflicts 85 cannot be connected with any individual trade unions, 
often due to the fact that it was wild cat strikes. Among the other 282 conflicts six indi-
vidual unions was involved in 188 conflicts, which is a broad majority. These six vastly 
over-represented unions are hereby called “high conflict unions” in the text and tables. 
Four of these are affiliated to LO (SEF, Swedish Painter's Union, Swedish Transport 
Worker's Union and Swedish Building Workers´ Union) while the other two are non-
affiliated. (Swedish Dockworkers Union and the syndicalist SAC).  
Most of the unions with many conflicts have few members. If unions are ranked in or-
der of conflict frequency per member, two of the smallest unions in the LO family place 
rank among the highest together with the small syndicalist SAC and the miniscule Swed-
ish Dockworkers Union. Among those unions with really low levels, there are many of 
the larger LO and TCO-affiliated unions. Most of the high conflict unions have increased 
their relative share of the total conflicts during the later years.  
The high conflict unions preferably organize privately employed male working class, 
in the domestic sector. Transport, construction and electricity services are such industries 
protected from foreign competition, so far, and they do not face stiff domestic competi-
tion either. These industries have had extensive regulations, almost corporatist elements, 
protecting them from competition and combined union and business interests have often 
influenced politicians to keep or strengthen these regulations (Lindberg 2008).    13 
 
Which conflict weapons are used and what are the causes? 
 
The  issue  of  weapons  used  in  labour  conflicts  is  seldom  studied.  Regardless  of  the 
sources available, this aspect is difficult to compare since blockades, for example, are not 
counted in either the National Mediation Office published statistics or  the Thörnqvist 
(2000) study. The data presented here are based on a study of the press notices and other 
documents that have been preserved.  
Some trends between 1993 and 2005 can be noted. First and foremost, it seems that 
lock-outs and wildcat strikes have declined in importance while the blockades are more 
common, primarily during the 2000s. Could and should this be related to changing pro-
duction conditions and/or institutional conditions? Before we proceed to the question, 




Table 3. Conflicts and causes in Sweden (separated in six “high conflict unions”, the rest and 
others) 1993-2005. 
Cause of conflict   High 
number 














Collective bargaining  64  17,4  21  5,7  1  0,3  86  23,4 
Secondary action  24  6,5  38  10,4  0  0,0  62  16,9 
Wages, and related issues  67  18,3  41  11,2  27  7,4  135  36,9 
Other (personnel, employ-
ment) 
32  8,7  13  3,5  26  7,1  71  19,3 
Unknown  1  0,3  5  1,4  7  1,9  13  3,6 
Total  188  51,2  118  32,2  61  16,6  367  100 
Source: National Conciliation Board 1993–99 and National Meditation Office 2000–05. 
 
It seems that the high conflict unions are heavily over-represented in conflicts overall and 
most notably those concerning collective bargaining. The Building Workers Union, the 
Painters' Union and SEF have almost two-thirds or 56 of the 86 conflicts. Secondary 
strikes make for a substantial part but they are concentrated in time, three years stand out:   14 
1995 and 2004-5. Secondary strikes were in most cases used to persuade companies to 
sign a collective agreement.  
The difference between the high conflict unions and the rest is apparent. High-conflict 
unions represent more than half of the total conflicts and the difference is also increasing 
over the period 1993-2005. If the trend continues, then a few unions have conflicts regu-
larly while they turn out to be more and more rare for the vast majority of workers and 
unions. This concentrated pattern with divergent causes is something that we have not 
previously experienced in Sweden.  
Conclusions and explanations 
The number of conflicts seems to have declined substantially during the 1990s and they 
are at historically low levels. But this does not mean that labour disputes will be unexcit-
ing to study. What we can trace is a fundamental change in conflict pattern that takes 
place in Sweden. Most conflicts nowadays and since the 1990s are linked to a few small 
unions while the vast majority have become much less conflict-prone. Blockade popular-
ity has grown, while strikes and lockouts have gone to the opposite direction. Finally, the 
issues that the parties fight for is no longer predominantly wage and salary conditions. 
Such conflicts are more uncommon but conflicts about collective bargaining as such be-
come or sympathy actions in favour of another union are on the rise.  
The new type of conflicts concerning collective bargaining 
 
The Swedish collective bargaining model is a partially unique system in a European con-
text. The collective agreements play a crucial role in the relationship between employer 
and employee. It is the main regulative instrument at the Swedish labour market. Collec-
tive agreement is broader than just include wages and benefits, it can also cover working 
conditions, and employment conditions. Thanks to the strength of the collective agree-
ments, Sweden has no minimum wage legislation, as many Anglo-Saxon countries have, 
and no extension mechanism, as in many continental European countries. So, the Swed-
ish model is based on a high bargaining coverage ratio in order to standardize wages and 
employment conditions. Otherwise the unions fear that employees outside the collective 
bargaining system will accept lower wages and worse employment conditions with in the   15 
long run also will affect those employees inside the collective bargaining system (Malm-
berg 2000). 
So, there  are motives for unions to  try  and persuade  employers to sign  collective 
agreements and thereby limit the competition at the labour market and prevent a “race to 
the bottom”. With the existing strike rules in Sweden, which give unions the right to put 
employers  in  blockade,  despite  not  having  any  members  at  that  company  and  gives 
unlimited right to sympathy action, these types of conflicts are crucial for the Swedish 
system. But why have these types of conflicts increased in some sectors and industries?  
Now we come back to the changing structural business conditions. When workers in 
Sweden meet competition from foreign workers and domestic employees not covered by 
Swedish collective bargaining, there is a strong incentive to limit this type of competition 
and this is handled through industrial action, strikes and blockades (Moberg 2006). It is 
evident from the available data on conflicts and strike activity that those sectors most af-
fected by conflicts concerning collective bargaining is transport and construction services 
hitherto mainly domestic, but increasingly meeting competition from abroad.  
It should be noted, however, that the vast majority of the cases where the unions de-
mand collective agreements that apply to all employers did not lead to an industrial ac-
tion. According to the National Mediation Office more than 2000 application agreements 
were  signed  between  2001  and  2005.  Out  of  those,  not  more  than  50-70  each  year, 
needed further mediation since the parties could not agree. The international dimension in 
these conflicts has grown. In the 1990s, conflict with a foreign party on collective bar-
gaining was extremely rare – a handful each year – but during the 2000's, they increased 
substantially in number. 
The conflicts of wages in a new perspective 
 
Despite the decreasing number, conflicts concerning wages and other working conditions 
still break out. Globalization may have dampened unions and opportunities for industrial 
action in general, but not in all industries. Nowadays, the conflict potential is limited in 
many sectors because of the growing foreign dependency and possibilities for business to 
outsource or move abroad. The traditional wage disputes are most common in some spe-
cific sectors such as electricity, transport and construction.    16 
The previously described trends where there is a growing interdependence between 
different industrial sectors that lead to a disruptive potential or large workplace bargain-
ing power. That means that employees and unions in services that are extremely essential 
for the industrial networks, for example electricity and transportation, will therefore have 
larger incentives to strike in the interests of their members, than others. Opportunity to 
exploit such conditions is primarily in industries where both foreign and external compe-
tition is low, where the costs can be passed on to consumers or taxpayers. In such sectors, 
we have less incentives for wage-moderation. 
So, the new conditions of production also affect the strike pattern. Globalization, in-
creasing competition and the integration of production change the causes and other fun-
damentals of industrial action. This evolving multidimensional strike pattern makes it 
more intricate to interpret the data on strikes and it also gives a broad hint that in strike 
statistics, not only the aggregate and the average matters.    17 
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